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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a3(k) (1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury on a presumption of

negligence in a rear-end automobile accident?1
Because jury instructions are matters of law, the appellate court reviews the
appropriateness of an instruction under a "correction of error standard." Ames v. Maas, 846
P.2d 468, 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). If the jury instructions as a whole "fairly instruct the jury
on the [applicable] law," the appellate court will affirm the trial court. IdL Even if the trial
court has committed error in failing to instruct the jury, the appellate court will not reverse
without a demonstration that "prejudice stem[s] from the instructions in the aggregate." Id.
2.

Did the trial court err in allowing an unavoidable accident defense theory to be

presented to the jury?
A party is entitled to have its theories of the case submitted to the jury so long as the
theories are viable at law and there is competent evidence to support them. Carpet Barn v. State
of Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "[A party] is entitled to have his case
submitted to the jury on any theory justified by proper evidence." Morrison v. Perry. 140 P.2d
772 (Utah 1943). Whether competent evidence exists to support a claim or defense theory is a
matter of law. Accordingly, the court's actions will be reviewed under a standard of correctness
of law. Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Disallowing the
presentation of a theory would be tantamount to a directed verdict against that theory and the
appellate court can reverse only if the evidence is such that reasonable men could not arrive at
different conclusions given the evidence. Rhiness v. Dansie. 24 Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428
(1970).

Plaintiff has violated Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A) in that plaintiff has
not provided a citation to the record showing that the issues presented were preserved in the trial
court. As will be more fully shown in defendant's brief, the plaintiff has failed to preserve a
number of issues.
1

3.

Did the trial court err in failing to grant plaintiffs Motion for a Judgment NOV

or a New Trial?
"An insufficiency of the evidence challenge to a denial of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is governed by one standard of review. The appellate court would
reverse only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed, it
concludes the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14,
17 (Utah 1988).
"A trial court's grant or denial of a motion for a new trial will not be overturned on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Knight v. Ebert. 824 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
4.

Did the trial court err in denying plaintiffs motion to have costs taxed by the

court?
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Morgan v. Morgan. 795
P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

RULES AND RELEVANT STATUTES
The texts of the following rules and statutes are contained in the addendum to plaintiffs
brief, and pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(2) appellee refers the court to the same: U.R.C.P.
50, U.R.C.P. 51, U.R.C.P. 54(d), U.R.C.P. 59, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-8 (1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The action below arose out of an automobile accident which occurred on the 1-15
freeway, just south of the point of the mountain. (R. 508 at 73). The plaintiff Anna Anderson
testified that as she approached the Lehi exit on 1-15, there was a change in weather and it began
to get cloudy. (R. 508 at 72). Thereafter, it became windy, wet, and the snow began to blow
across the freeway.

(R, 508 at 73). Plaintiff admitted pursuant to affidavit that she was
2

traveling at 45 miles an hour, although at trial she stated that she was travelling at 50 to 55
miles per hour. (R. 508 at 102). The plaintiff testified that she could have been off in her
estimation as much as 10 miles per hour. (R.508 at 103). Plaintiff also admitted in her affidavit
that she braked when she entered a cloud of snow. (R. 508 at 104-5).
Plaintiff has recited in her brief a number of her statements to which she testified which
are mainly aimed at buttressing plaintiffs theory of the case. But in failing to marshal the
evidence, plaintiff has chosen not to highlight or even mention those facts which are detrimental
to her case, but upon which the verdict may have rested. Plaintiffs failure to marshal the
evidence is more fully discussed infra at 30.
The evidence which plaintiff failed to marshal is as follows:
As the plaintiff was approaching and attempting to pass the snow plow, she testified
"mainly I was focused on the snow plow." (R. 508 at 75). Plaintiff further indicated that she
saw brake lights ahead of her although she could not see the vehicles. (R. 508 at 75). After
seeing these brake lights ahead of her, she moved into the center lane, which was the lane in
which the defendant was travelling and the lane in which the accident occurred. (R. 508 at 76).
The plaintiff stated that she was nervous prior to the accident (R. 508 at 76), and in fact, was
paranoid when driving on roads and did not like driving. (R. 508 at 117). She stated that her
reason for nervousness on the roads was that her brother had been killed in an automobile
accident. (R. 508 at 117). Plaintiff admitted that she slowed down upon passing the snow plow,
(R. 508 at 77), and that she braked because she thought she might strike someone. (R. 508 at
3

117). In fact, plaintiff acknowledged that the driver behind her might not have been able to see
her, and that she was troubled because of that fact. (R. 508 at 117-18). Plaintiff stated that she
was blinded by the snow. (R. 508 at 116).
Plaintiffs testimony concerning where she was in respect to the snow plow at the time
of the accident is inconsistent and contradictory. Under direct examination she estimated that
she was two minutes past the snow plow, and gave the indication that this meant a long distance.
(R. 508 at 77). On cross-examination the plaintiff admitted that her previous estimations had
been that she was within feet of the snow plow. (R. 508 at 109). Plaintiff's statement to the
responding UHP officer was that she was next to the snow plow. (R. 508 at 124).
Again, inconsistent and contradictory, the plaintiff stated on direct examination that she
saw the defendant in her rear-view mirror prior to the accident occurring. (R. 508 at 78).
However, in prior testimony plaintiff stated she did not see the defendant prior to the collision
(R. 508 at 119), and that she had no idea where the defendant came from. (R. 508 at 119).
Plaintiffs statement to the Utah Highway Patrol at the scene of the accident was read to
the jury. It stated: "The [plaintiff] stated to [the officer] that as she pulled next to a UDOT
snow removal unit heading northbound, strong winds created a blizzard type effect completely
engulfing her vehicle." And further, that as she slowed, another vehicle, a 1972 Ford, struck
her from behind. (R. 508 at 124). The jury knew of other inconsistent statements such as
plaintiffs admitting, for example, that she told her doctor that her vehicle spun out of control,
where in reality it only fishtailed. (R. 508 at 125). The plaintiff stated that when the accident
4

occurred she moved forward and then back (R. 508 at 127), and that items on the seats were
thrown forward and onto the floor. (R. 508 at 128).
These are items of evidence which the plaintiff should have marshalled, along with the
following to which Mr. Sharp testified.2 While plaintiff is correct in most of her statement of
facts as to testimony of Mr. Sharp, particularly that the snow plow hit a pile of snow and
completely blocked his vision by throwing snow up in the air (R. 509 at 167), plaintiff has
inaccurately presented some of the testimony of Mr. Sharp. Plaintiff states in her brief at page
9: "Mr. Sharp acknowledged that it was within the range of his experience that snow plows
occasionally hit snow and plowed it [sic], and that snow flies from a plow when it hits a drift."
However, Mr. Sharp's testimony was actually as follows:
Question: You recognize that snow plows occasionally hit snow and plow it; do you not?
That is within the range of your experience; was it not?
Answer: Uh, huh (affirmative).
Question: Was it within the range of your experience to see snow fly from a snow plow
and occasionally hit a drift?
Answer: That is the first time I have ever experienced that.
Question: Never had the experience of that before?
Answer: Never.
(R. 509 at 191). While plaintiffs statement in her brief that it was within Mr. Sharp's
experience that snow plows occasionally plow snow, the fact that snow flies from a plow when

2

Plaintiff claims that Mr. Sharp's testimony was contradictory. See plaintiff's brief at
7, n.5. For the purposes of this appeal, this court must assume that the jury found Mr. Sharp
credible. The appellate court must construe all evidence in defendant's favor. Peats v.
Commercial Sec. Bank. 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277
(Utah 1988).
5

it hits a drift and creates a blizzard effect was not within the range of Mr. Sharp's experience
as claimed by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff correctly recites the facts which show that the jury could have found that the
defendant committed no negligent act and acted reasonably under the circumstances. Mr. Sharp
felt he following the plaintiff at a safe distance, specifically that he was "a football field" behind
the plaintiff. (R. 509 at 168). By the time Mr. Sharp caught up to the plaintiff, and after the
plaintiff had been obscured by a cloud of snow, Mr. Sharp was only travelling five to ten miles
an hour. (R. 509 at 196).
Plaintiff fails to present the following evidence which, if marshalled, supports the verdict
in this matter and exhibit further that defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances. When
the snow which had been blown and was completely blocking defendant's vision momentarily
cleared, defendant immediately saw the plaintiff, braked in order to avoid the accident, and
bumped the plaintiff. (R. 509 at 167). Defendant felt that if the plaintiff had pushed on the gas,
there would have been no accident whatsoever. (R. 509 at 169). The impact was so slight
defendant felt no movement to his body. (R. 509 at 169). In fact, the impact caused hardly any
damage to plaintiff's vehicle. (See Exhibit 45 attached hereto in the addendum).
The defendant stated that he was not in a hurry, particularly that he had no schedule to
meet. (R. 509 at 181). By the time the accident occurred, it appeared to the defendant that the
plaintiff was stopped or almost stopped on the freeway. (R. 509 at 195). In fact, defendant
estimated plaintiffs speed at the time of the accident to be within 5 to 10 miles an hour. (R. 509
6

at 196). Again, this is the evidence which the plaintiff should have marshalled, but did not.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE THE MATORITY OF ALLEGED
ERRORS PRESENTED IN THIS APPEAL. Specifically, plaintiff has failed to preserve the
issue of whether plaintiff had a right to an instruction regarding a presumption of negligence.
Plaintiff never submitted an instruction dealing with any presumption of negligence, but only
requested an instruction regarding the application of common sense to a given set of facts. In
addition, plaintiff made no objection to the trial court's failure to give a presumption instruction.
As a result, the court should not consider the issue.
I,

PLAINTIFF HAD NO RIGHT TO AN INSTRUCTION REGARDING A

PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE. There exists no presumption in Utah law that a driver
who rear-ends another vehicle is presumed negligent. The plaintiff asks this court to adopt the
holding of the Colorado Supreme Court in Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1988).
However, the case at bar highlights why such a presumption should not exist where the plaintiff
is contributorily negligent to the extent that the jury may easily find that the defendant is not
negligent at all. In fact, this was the actual holding of Bettner v. Boring.
An instruction which includes a presumption of negligence contradicts established Utah
law. Utah law holds that the mere fact that an accident occurs does not support a conclusion
that any party is negligent. Also, the statutes of Utah provide reciprocal rights running between
both following and leading drivers. A rear-end presumption instruction would vitiate and render
7

a nullity common law and the statutes of Utah. A rear-end collision presumption is inapplicable
under Utah's application of res ipsa loquitur. In Utah, the only benefit a plaintiff derives from
an application of res ipsa loquitur is defeating a defendant's motion for a non-suit. While in
Colorado an application of res ipsa loquitur might raise a rebuttable presumption, in Utah only
an inference arises. The defendant is under no obligation to rebut the inference; the jury may
simply reject it.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO

PRESENT AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT THEORY TO THE JURY.

Defendant's

theory of the case did not rest upon unavoidable accident only, but also upon the defenses that
the plaintiff was the more negligent party, and that the defendant acted reasonably under the
circumstances. Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant's only theory was that this incident
constituted an unavoidable accident and that the jury decided this matter under defendant's
theory, the trial court nonetheless committed no error.

While an unavoidable accident

instruction is precluded pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Randle v. Allen. 862
P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993), an unavoidable accident theory is permissible. In fact, the court in
Randle specifically stated that parties could argue that the accident was unavoidable and that a
jury, applying proper instructions on the elements of negligence and burden of proof, could find
no liability. This is, of course, what happened in this case.
i n , THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL SUPPORTS THE VERDICT. This
court should not address this issue as plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence. Nonetheless,
8

the evidence admitted exhibits that defendant committed no negligent act, but acted reasonably
under the circumstances. The jury could have concluded that neither party was negligent, or that
only the plaintiff was negligent. The evidence showed that the highway was wet and visibility
was severely diminished, not due to normal weather conditions, but due to a snow plow kicking
up snow during a period of extreme wind. Plaintiff, already traveling quite slowly, braked after
her vehicle became engulfed in a cloud of snow. Plaintiff expressed concern that she might hit
someone, or that she might be hit from behind. There is no evidence that defendant was
traveling at a speed too fast for conditions, or that he was following the plaintiff too closely.
As soon as the snow cleared and the defendant was able to perceive the plaintiff, he reacted and
attempted to avoid the accident.
IV, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
DEFENDANT'S COSTS. Although the plaintiff asks this court to reverse the Utah Supreme
Court and disallow depositions as costs, this court must follow the well-established law that
deposition and transcript costs are recoverable. A review of the record below indicates that both
the defendant and court followed the proper procedure in requesting and awarding costs. The
court found that the deposition costs were reasonable and necessary. A review of the record
indicates that under Utah law the deposition costs awarded were well within the trial court's
discretion. Additionally, transcript costs are specifically provided for by statute.
In sum, defendant maintains that plaintiff has waived her right to review the majority of
the issues raised in this appeal by failing to preserve them in a timely manner. In any event,
9

none of the claimed errors below withstands careful analysis. Plaintiff has argued no reasonable
grounds for reversal and the record is clear that plaintiff had her day in court and is entitled to
nothing more. Defendant requests this court to affirm the jury's verdict as well as the court's
order awarding costs.
ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF HAD NO RIGHT TO AN INSTRUCTION REGARDING A
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE IN A REAR-END AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
A^ PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE THIS ISSUE
Plaintiff never submitted an instruction dealing with any presumption of negligence, but
only requested an instruction quoting verbatim from Bullock v. Ungricht. 538 P.2d 190 (Utah
1975) regarding the application of common sense to a set of facts. Plaintiff can hardly assign
error to the trial court for failing to give a jury instruction which plaintiff never submitted or
otherwise requested.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides:
At the close of evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party
may file written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the request prior
to instructing the jury; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or
otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all
objections thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise,
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but before the
jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure
to give an instruction unless he objects thereto.
(Emphasis added). Although under Rule 51 the appellate court is allowed in its discretion to
10

review the failure to give an instruction where the issue is not preserved below, the appellate
court should so act only under unusual circumstances, where the interests of justice urgently so
demand, and where the aggrieved party has presented a persuasive reason for the appellate court
to exercise that discretion. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991);
Williams v. Lloyd. 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166 (1965). In this case, plaintiff has made no
showing of unusual circumstances or that the interests of justice urgently demand a review of
this issue.
Plaintiffs proposed jury instructions were submitted to the court on August 10, 1992.
After that submission, there is no objection or request on the record asking the court to submit
the proffered instruction. In accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51, the court gave
the attorneys the instructions it intended to give to the jury. (R. 509 at 206). Subsequently, the
court, prior to submitting the instructions to the jury, allowed the attorneys for both plaintiff and
defendant to make objections and exceptions to the jury instructions. (See R. 510 commencing
at 216). Although plaintiff was given the opportunity, plaintiff made no record whatsoever in
regard to the court instructing or not instructing the jury regarding any presumption of
negligence in a rear-end accident.
The Utah Supreme Court in King v. Fereday. 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987) refused to
exercise its discretion in considering an assignment of error as to a jury instruction where
counsel had an opportunity to enter objections on the record and failed to do so. The party
claiming an error in the proceedings bears the responsibility of assuring that "the record
11

adequately preserves an objection or argument for review in the event of an appeal." (citation
omitted). Id. at 621. As stated, the record shows no indication that plaintiff objected to the
refusal of the court to give her proffered instructions. Since the plaintiff did not preserve any
objection to the trial court's alleged refusal to instruct the jury on a presumption in a rear-end
accident, and no such instruction was ever requested, this court should not consider the same.
B^

THERE EXISTS NO PRESUMPTION IN UTAH LAW THAT A DRIVER
WHO REAR ENDS ANOTHER VEHICLE IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT

In fact, the plaintiff admits that Utah courts have not addressed the issue of a rear-end
collision presumption. See Appellant's Brief at 20. Instead, plaintiff invites this court to follow
other courts that allegedly hold that there exists such a presumption.3 To accept plaintiff's
invitation to create such a presumption in the State of Utah would go against well established
common law and the statutory provisions of the Utah Code. Surprisingly, the case of Bullock
v. Ungricht. 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975), which plaintiff cites in her support, supports
defendant's, not plaintiffs, position.
The Bullock court does not speak of a presumption, but only that "common sense and
experience" can sometimes lead to a conclusion that a following car has disregarded a duty to
keep a lookout and to keep the car under control and is, therefore, at fault. As the court points

3

Actually, plaintiff is mistaken when she asserts that it is commonly held that a following
driver is presumed negligent in a rear-end accident. A thorough review of the cases cited by
plaintiff indicates that such a presumption is not universally accepted. In fact, the cases which
plaintiff cites are not even supportive of her own position. See infra page
.
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out: "Such a conclusion is not necessarily correct." Id. at 191. The court in Bullock highlights
a duty to lookout and a duty to keep a vehicle under control, two points which were highlighted
for the jury in the instructions in this case. The Bullock court only validates common sense;
Bullock makes no new law upon which an instruction could be submitted to the jury.
In addressing whether a directed verdict or a judgment NOV should have been entered,
the court in Bullock held:
This court has often affirmed a proposition that unless the facts relating to negligence and
contributory negligence are so free from doubt that reasonable minds could not differ
thereon a jury question exists; and that if there is doubt about the matter, it should be
resolved in favor of according the parties the right of trial by jury of those disputed
issues.
Id. In sum, if the facts are so one-sided that the following driver is obviously and as a matter
of law negligent, then it is proper for the court to enter a directed verdict against the following
driver, not instruct the jury as to any "presumption." Accordingly, the negligence instructions
given to the jury in this and many other cases fulfill the needs and the rights of both parties in
having the jury correctly instructed as to the elements of negligence. Bullock simply does not
address the presumption issue.
In the final analysis, whether a plaintiff is hit from the rear, the side, or the front is
irrelevant. See Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829, 835 (Colo. 1988). What the finder of fact
should consider is whether the parties involved kept their perspective lookouts, kept their
vehicles under control, or breached any other duty owing to other drivers on the roads. An
instruction outlining a presumption overemphasizes the plaintiffs case, and creates in the mind
IB

of the jury the proposition that the plaintiff does not have to prove her case, but instead the
defendant carries the burden of proof. Such a conclusion is not supported by the law of Utah.
If the appellate court chooses to recognize a presumption in rear-end accidents, the court
will allow the circumvention of the elements of negligence which need to be proven in a tort
case. Such an instruction would allow a party who, after passing a vehicle, could swerve
directly in front of that vehicle, slam on her brakes, cause a collision, and walk into court
having a burden placed upon the following driver to present exculpatory evidence or have the
jury forced to find for the plaintiff. The case at bar highlights why such a presumption should
not exist, where the plaintiff is contributorily negligent to the extent that a jury may reasonably
find that the defendant was not negligent at all.
C

AN INSTRUCTION ON A
CONTRADICTS UTAH LAW

PRESUMPTION

OF

NEGLIGENCE

In Utah jurisprudence, the plaintiff always has the affirmative duty of showing that the
defendant was negligent. Utah law holds that the mere fact that an accident occurs does not
support a conclusion that the defendant or any other party is at fault or negligent. See, Kitchen
v. CalGas Co.. Inc.. 821 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied. 832 P.2d 476 (1992);
Williams v. Ogden Union. R.R.. Ry & Depot Co.. 119 Utah 529, 230 P.2d 315 (Utah 1951).
If a trial court were to instruct the jury that a presumption of negligence exists when a following
car rear-ends another car, then the trial court would be, in fact, instructing the jury that the mere
fact an accident happens indicates the defendant was negligent in contradiction of Utah law.
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The trial court below instructed the jury, to which no objection was made, that it is a
duty of every driver to use reasonable care to avoid danger. (R. 322). This instruction,
instruction number 11, further advised the jury that every driver is obliged: (1) to keep a lookout
for other vehicles and highway conditions which reasonably may be anticipated; (2) to keep the
vehicle under proper control; (3) to drive at a safe speed, having proper regard for the width,
surface, and condition of the highway, other traffic, visibility, and any existing or potential
hazards; (4) to follow another vehicle at a safe distance, with proper regard for both vehicles
speed, other traffic, and highway conditions; and, (5) to stop or suddenly slow down only after
observing that it can be done safely, and if an opportunity exists, after signalling. 1±
As instruction 11 highlights, there are reciprocal rights running from all vehicles to each
other, i.e. to keep a proper lookout, keep the vehicle under control, drive at a safe speed.
Likewise, as paragraph 4 of instruction 11 points out, the following vehicle has specific duties
running to any vehicle in front of it. Similarly, paragraph 5 of instruction 11 points out duties
running from the plaintiff to the defendant in this case: not to stop or suddenly slow down if it
cannot be done safely. Any instruction on a presumption of negligence in a rear-end accident
would vitiate and render a nullity the statutes of the State of Utah in that the duties running from
the following driver would be emphasized, and the duties applied to the plaintiff in this case
would be wholly ignored.
For these reasons, had the plaintiff properly brought this instruction before the court and
insisted on it being given to the jury, the court would have been well within its discretion and
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correct as a matter of law in not giving the instruction to the jury. In fact, the plaintiff herself
points out that numerous Utah cases hold that: "a motorist who collides with a stationary vehicle
on a highway is not guilty of negligence as a matter of law without respect to the totality of the
circumstances."

See plaintiffs brief at 20-21. Surely, if a motorist who collides with a

stationary vehicle is not negligent as a matter of law, then an accident involving moving vehicles
is even less compelling.
D. A PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE IS INAPPLICABLE IN THE STATE OF
UTAH UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Contrary to plaintiffs conclusion, Utah's application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does not support a jury receiving an instruction on the presumption of negligence in a rear-end
accident. The Colorado Supreme Court in Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1988)
derived its rear-end collision presumption rule from Iacino v. Brown. 217 P.2d 266 (Colo.
1950), wherein the court created a rear-end collision presumption under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Id. at 258. The court in Brown applied res ipsa loquitur because the plaintiff, sitting
in a parked car when the defendant hit him from behind, "could not reasonably be expected to
account for a cause of the accident not within his knowledge." Id. In this case, the plaintiff can
be expected to account for a cause of the accident within her knowledge. As will be shown
hereafter, infra page 32, plaintiff was negligent and there existed an abundance of evidence for
the jury to find defendant was not negligent or that the plaintiff herself was the proximate cause
of the accident.
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Plaintiff has failed to recognize that the applications of res ipsa loquitur in Colorado and
in Utah differ.

In Utah, res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine which establishes a

defendant's duty and breach of that duty. Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care Ctr.. 741 P.2d 969, 971
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). To apply res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff must show that: (1) the accident
was of the kind which in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the
defendant used due care; (2) the instrument or thing causing the injury was at the time of the
accident under the management and control of the defendant; and, (3) the accident happened
irrespective of any participation at the time by the plaintiff. Id. 971. Even under normal res
ipsa loquitur standards, the doctrine does not apply in this case. This accident is not one of a
kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the defendant used
due care. This accident arose out of extraordinary circumstances where extreme care could have
been and was exercised by the defendant, but a minor and insignificant touching of the vehicles
occurred nonetheless. The jury could find that the causative instrument was plaintiffs braking
vehicle, not defendant's car. But most important, the accident did not occur irrespective of any
participation at the time by the plaintiff. Instead, plaintiff herself was negligent, and as the jury
obviously found pursuant to their verdict, the defendant was not negligent.
Even if the plaintiff could make a showing of all three elements of res ipsa loquitur, all
she would gain is an avoidance of a directed verdict motion. Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d
348.352 (Utah 1980)(plaintiff applying res ipsa loquitur doctrine has the benefit of getting past
a defendant's motion for a non-suit). Res ipsa loquitur raises only an inference of negligence,
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not a presumption of negligence, which a jury may choose to accept or reject. King v. Searle
Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 832 P.2d 858, 861 (Utah 1992). Thus, unlike Colorado law which
presumes negligence under res ipsa loquitur, Utah law only infers negligence, which inference
may be rejected by the jury. The presumption argued by plaintiff cannot be rejected by the jury
and therefore is distinguishable from Utah law.
Of further distinction in the application of res ipsa loquitur in Utah is the burden placed
on defendant once res ipsa is applied. It is said that the burden of going forward shifts to the
defendant to show that plaintiffs injury could have been caused by a person (including the
plaintiff) outside defendant's control. Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg. Medical Center. 791 P.2d
193, 199 (Utah 1990). Though the burden of going forward shifts, the burden of producing
evidence does not shift. "Although the defendant may adduce evidence [of other causes], the
defendant has no legal obligation to adduce evidence of non-culpability." Ballow v. Monroe.
699 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah 1985)(holding res ipsa establishes no presumption). While at first
glance there appears to be an inconsistency between the foregoing statement and one that
defendant has the burden of going forward, if one considers that a jury may simply disregard
an inference caused by res ipsa loquitur, the inconsistency disappears. This is a clear distinction
to plaintiffs allegation that a presumption arises. Indeed, after the plaintiff has put on her case
involving res ipsa loquitur, defendant has his turn and may attempt to show other causes of an
accident.

However, because the jury may simply reject the inference raised by res ipsa,

defendant has no burden to refute plaintiffs case. Defendant may simply let it go to the jury.
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Lastly, accepting plaintiffs argument that res ipsa loquitur is applicable to the present
case, then the most reasonable way for that issue to be presented to the trier of fact is not
through an instruction applicable only to automobile cases stating a presumption exists against
the following driver, but instead as provided in the Model Utah Jury Instruction 4.1, the jury
could simply be instructed as to res ipsa loquitur. There is no need for this court to create any
new law where the law already fashioned in the State of Utah would be appropriate.
K

THE PLAINTIFF WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO AN
INSTRUCTION ON THE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE EVEN IF
THE LAW OF SISTER JURISDICTIONS WERE APPLIED

As plaintiff has pointed out, the State of Colorado presumes negligence, sufficient to
make out only a prima facia case, when the following driver is involved in a rear-end collision.
Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829, 832 (Colo. 1988). In fact the Colorado Supreme Court in
Bettner stated:
[W]e cannot conclude that the rear-end collision instruction is required as a matter
of law in all cases, regardless of the circumstances of the collision, solely because
the front of one vehicle makes contact with the rear of another vehicle.
Id. at 834. In Bettner. the defendant's car slid into the plaintiffs car, which happened to be
approximately 25 feet from the road. The court held that there was not presumption of the
defendant's negligence since colliding with the rear of the plaintiffs truck bespeaks negligence
no more than colliding with the front of it. Id. at 835. Instead, in disallowing the use of a
presumption instruction, the Bettner court said that the particular facts of the case must be
reviewed.
19

The majority of the cases cited by plaintiff support defendant's point of view.4 Both
Norris v. Gatts. 738 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1987) and Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1988)
disallowed the use of any instruction stating a presumption of negligence in a rear-end accident.
As far as the cases which plaintiff cites are concerned, only Colorado holds that such a
presumption instruction may be given and exists. Alaska does not presume negligence, but only
holds that an inference is raised, and indicates a strict application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Further, the plaintiff has apparently not appreciated that the cases of Boring v.
Bettner, 739 P.2d 884 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) and Bettner v. Boring are one and the same case,
the Supreme Court of Colorado in Bettner v. Boring overturning the Colorado Court of Appeals
in Boring v. Bettner.

The court's analysis in Bettner. accordingly, centered around an

instruction which was rejected by the trial court, and which rejection was sustained by the
Colorado Supreme Court. That instruction is cited in full in plaintiffs brief at 20, n.6.5
In Bettner. the jury found for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. The Colorado

4

Norris v. Gatts. 738 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1987) does not find a presumption, but only an
inference of negligence under res ipsa. Likewise, the court in Hahn v. Russ. 611 P.2d 66, 67
(Alaska 1980) did not find a presumption, but held: "Where there is no reason to anticipate the
conduct of the preceding driver, the driver who follows may not be responsible for the
collision," and further stated a similar proposition as the Bullock court, "under normal
circumstances one who rear-ends a vehicle is generally negligent. "Id.
5

Plaintiff states that the instruction quoted in plaintiffs brief at 20, n.6 is an instruction used
by the Colorado courts. Such a statement is misleading. A review of Bettner only shows that
that instruction on a presumption was simply a rejected instruction which had been submitted
by plaintiff's counsel.
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Court of Appeals determined that the trial court committed reversible error when it declined to
give the plaintiffs tendered jury instruction on the presumption of negligence arising out of a
rear-end collision. The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari and concluded that the
trial court's refusal to give the tendered instruction on the facts of the case did not constitute
reversible error. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Colorado in Bettner reinstated the jury's
verdict. IcL
The court in Bettner explains that the rear-end collision jury instruction is derived from
their holding in Iacino v. Brown. 217 P.2d 266 (1950), which allowed the use of a presumption
instruction based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Bettner. 764 P.2d at 832. The court
in Bettner cited numerous cases explaining the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Colorado including
Saliman v. Silk. 194 P.2d 304 (1948) which held:
When it can, with equal reasonableness, be inferred that the accident in question
was due to another cause then the negligence of the defendant, the doctrine cannot
be invoked.
Id, at 305. An objective reading of the Bettner holding indicates that the fact that one car hits
another from the rear does not entitle one to any instruction, whether considering a presumption
of negligence or a normal res ipsa loquitur instruction. Instead, the court must look to the
circumstances of the accident to determine if someone other than the defendant, including the
plaintiff, might be negligent.
The court in Bettner reviewed holdings from several jurisdictions, some of which are
quoted by plaintiff in her brief. Significantly, the court in Bettner cites the case of Clevenger
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v. Walters. 419 S.W. 2d 102, 106 (Mo. 1967) wherein the court stated: "[N]ot even all rearend collisions fall within the [res ipsa loquitur] doctrine." Plaintiffs only argument in the case
at bar is that since defendant's vehicle made contact with the rear of plaintiffs vehicle, he is
entitled to an instruction. Yet the cases cited by plaintiff in her brief do not support such a
conclusion.
Interestingly, in Bettner. before submitting the case to the jury, the judge gave a directed
verdict to the plaintiff that he was not negligent. Accordingly, the holding of the court in
Bettner is that there may be rear-end accidents which occur, where the plaintiff is not negligent
as a matter of law, a defendant is nonetheless free from negligence as well. The Bettner court
found: "The record shows that the three elements of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine were not met
by the facts of this case, because causes other than defendant's negligence were not sufficiently
eliminated by the evidence." Id. at n. 4. In sum, the case of Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829
(Colo. 1988), which overruled Boring v. Bettner. 739 P.2d 884 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987), does not
support plaintiffs position.
Plaintiffs citation of Hahn v. Russ. 611 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1980) is misplaced, as it
supports none of the positions for which it is offered. The Hahn decision, which encompasses
only 1 and 1/2 pages in the Pacific Reporter, makes no mention of any presumption of
negligence, but similar to Bullock, states that it is a matter of common understanding that one
who rear-ends another vehicle under normal circumstances is generally negligent. However,
when the facts of Hahn are applied to the law stated therein and the holding is thereby gleaned,
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Hahn only supports the proposition that under the facts of Hahn the trial court should have
directed a verdict for the plaintiff.6
As the preceding analysis exhibits, if this court objectively views the case law cited by
the plaintiff in her support, the court must come to the conclusion that the case law actually
supports defendant's position, and that any refusal by a trial court to give the proffered
instruction under the facts of this case constituted no reversible error.
Even applying the law of Colorado, plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction on the
presumption of negligence. As plaintiff has stated:

"[F]or the presumption to apply, the

accident must have happened without any fault or negligence on the part of the leading driver."
See plaintiffs brief at 23. In this case, there is an abundance of evidence that the leading driver
was negligent and at fault and therefore the instruction should not have been given under any
circumstances. Accordingly, even if the instruction were a correct statement under Utah law,
which it is not, there would be no harm or prejudice suffered by the plaintiff in the court's
failure to so instruct the jury.

6

Plaintiff also cites the Hahn decision in support of her claim that a rear-end collision
presumption fits the requirements of res ipsa loquitur. See plaintiffs brief at 23. As stated, the
Hahn decision does not discuss any presumption of negligence, and more clearly, the Hahn
decision makes no reference whatsoever to res ipsa loquitur.
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IL

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO PRESENT
AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT THEORY TO THE JURY
£*

PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO APPEAL PRESENTATION
OF AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT THEORY TO THE JURY

Plaintiff assigns error to the allusion to or statement of law made as to unavoidable
accident at three distinct points of the trial.

First, plaintiff claims that the court, while

impaneling the jury, made an introductory statement which in essence set forth defendant's
unavoidable accident theory. Second, plaintiff contends that instruction number 9, stating that
the "mere fact that the events complained of occurred does not support an inference that any
party to this action was negligent," is substantially similar to the wording disapproved by the
Utah Supreme Court in Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) and is therefore an
unavoidable accident instruction.

Finally, plaintiff contends that defense counsel's closing

argument also included the theory of unavoidable accident. None of these alleged errors was
preserved below. As previously noted, in plaintiffs listing of the issues in her brief, she fails
to identify where in the record she has preserved these issues for appeal.
As to the introductory statement made by the court, cited in plaintiffs brief at 29, this
statement to which plaintiff now assigns error was read by the court in the first trial. At the
time the statement was given to the jury, during the impanelling at the second trial, plaintiff
made no objection. In fact, there appears absolutely no objection thereto anywhere in the record
below. Only after the fact, when any problem could not possibly be cured, does plaintiff now
wish to assign error. Plaintiff has simply waived this opportunity.
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During the proceedings, plaintiff was given the opportunity to object to any instructions
which she found to be a problem. Plaintiffs counsel took this opportunity to object to at least
nine jury instructions as specifically set forth in plaintiffs brief. See plaintiffs brief at 12 and
R. 510 at 218-19. Significantly, instruction number 9 to which plaintiff now assigns error is not
mentioned.
Lastly, the error alleged to have occurred during defendant's closing argument was not
preserved.

As far as closing arguments as to an unavoidable accident defense theory are

concerned, there was no objection made whatsoever.

Plaintiffs sole objection during

defendant's closing argument, which objection was sustained, concerned defendants asking the
jury to put themselves in the defendant's "shoes."

(R. 510 at 237). Accordingly, as to

plaintiffs discussion of defendant's utilization of an unavoidable accident theory, this issue has
been waived by the plaintiff for failure to preserve the matter below.
B±

WHILE AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT INSTRUCTION IS PRECLUDED,
AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT THEORY IS PERMISSIBLE

Plaintiff is correct in stating that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) struck down forever the use of unavoidable
accident instructions in a trial. However, the balance of plaintiffs argument, specifically that
the trial court committed err in allowing the presentation of an unavoidable accident theory is
misplaced.

Contrary to plaintiffs contentions, the court did not submit to the jury an

unavoidable accident instruction. Moreover, the plaintiff is mistaken in attempting to construe
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Randle to hold that there is no such thing as an unavoidable accident or that the plaintiff does
not have to meet her burden of proof in affirmatively establishing the defendant's negligence.
In fact, the Randle court expressly stated:
Of course, accidents do occur which might be unavoidable or for which the defendant
or defendants are not negligent. In such cases, if the state of evidence warrants it, the
trial judge should direct a verdict, or the jury, applying proper instructions on the
elements of negligence and burden of proof should find no liability.
Id. at 1336. Such was, of course, the defendant's theory of the case as properly stated by the
court in its preliminary statement.
The court should note that the statement the court read to the jury at the beginning of the
case was not a statement outlining the law of unavoidable accident, nor was it a statement which
emphasized defendant's theory of the case. The statement simply sets up the positions of the
respective parties and notes that defendant claims he was not negligent and that the accident was
due to two things: the unusual weather conditions at the time and the negligence of the plaintiff.
Likewise, in closing argument of defendant's counsel, counsel simply argues that his client was
not negligent. Whether or not the weather played a role in the accident, and specifically whether
the defendant acted prudently under the circumstances, are questions for the jury to decide.
Both defendant's closing argument and the statement read by the court at the beginning of trial
are both consistent with normal negligence theories and constitute no prejudicial error.
Plaintiff has alleged that the following instruction is substantially similar to the wording
disapproved of by the Utah Supreme Court in Randle v. Allen, less the express words
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"unavoidable accident:" "The mere fact that the events complained of occurred does not support
an inference that any party to this action was negligent." See plaintiffs brief at 29 and the
instruction given by the court at R. 324. This instruction is found in the Model Utah Jury
Instructions, number 3.3, and is not the same as an instruction on unavoidable accidents. The
Randle court's reason for disallowing the further use of the unavoidable accident instruction was
a fear that a jury might misapply or fail to apply the elements of negligence in finding liability
for one party or the other. See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1335. The court noted that jury instructions
should be phrased so as to help the jury reach a proper application of the elements of a cause
of action. The court stated:
The unavoidable accident instruction, however, circumvents proper application
of those elements and to that extent allows the jury to reach a result without
following the principles set out in the usual negligence instructions.
Id. at 1335.
The Randle court noted that the unavoidable accident instruction diverts the attention of
the jury from the primary issue of negligence and unnecessarily "creates the impression in the
minds of the jurors of a second hurdle the plaintiff must overcome if he is to prevail." Id.
(citing Graham v. Rolandson. 435 P.2d 263, 273 (Mont. 1967)). Because the "mere fact"
instruction (hereinafter MUJI 3.3) does not raise the same concerns as an unavoidable accident
instruction, MUJI 3.3 was properly submitted. MUJI 3.3 does not create an impression in the
minds of the jurors that a second hurdle for the plaintiff exists. Instead, MUJI 3.3 reminds the
jurors that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, or alternatively stated, the mere fact that
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an accident occurred raises no inference in favor of a verdict for the plaintiff or defendant.
More importantly, there exists a difference between MUJI 3.3 and an unavoidable
accident instruction which the Randle court itself pointed out. The Randle court noted that the
concept of an unavoidable accident was historically an affirmative defense to an action for
trespass, and therefore had to be pleaded and proved by the defendant. Id. at 1334. MUJI 3.3
has no similar history and is not really a defense at all. Instead, it is an instruction that points
the jury in the appropriate direction of determining the issue of negligence by examining the
elements of negligence.
The Utah Supreme Court in Randle lists a number of cases that it overruled to the extent
that they had approved the use of an unavoidable accident instruction. Id. at 1336. None of the
cases recognizing the use of instructions similar to MUJI 3.3 are found on that list. In fact, the
Utah Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the law in MUJI 3.3, and pointed out that the law
upon which the instruction is based has long been followed by Utah courts. Kitchen v. Cal Gas
Co.. Inc., 821 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied. 832 P.2d 476 (1992).
Cases allowing an instruction similar to MUJI 3.3 highlight the difference between that
instruction and an instruction on unavoidable accident. In Williams v. Ogden Union. R.R.. Ry.
& Depo Co.. 119 Utah 529, 230 P.2d 315 (Utah 1951), the court submitted the following
instruction to the jury. "The jury is instructed that the mere happening of an accident is not
proof of negligence on the part of either plaintiff or defendant or evidence of the same." The
court in Williams held:
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[The] instruction applies with equal force to the negligence of the defendant and
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Contrary to plaintiffs contention, it
does not withdraw from the jury consideration of facts and inferences that might
reasonably be considered by the jury in determining negligence of the defendant.
Id. at 323. As the Williams court's statement highlights, an instruction similar to MUJI 3.3
does not emphasize one party's theory over the other's. The instruction is equally applicable
to both. The Williams decision shows that the giving of an instruction similar to MUJI 3.3 leads
the jury closer to, not farther away from, a correct analysis of a negligence cause of action than
if the instruction were not given.
Accordingly, plaintiff's assertion that instruction number 9 amounted to an instruction
on unavoidable accident is without merit. An allegation of error on the ground that plaintiff
presented the theory of an unavoidable accident and argued the same in his closing argument has
no basis at law considering the fact that the Randle court allowed, and in fact invited, parties
to continue to present theories of unavoidable accident, but simply not to instruct on the same.7

7

Randle is not the first case to preclude the use of an instruction while allowing
arguments and theories based thereon to continue. The Supreme Court of Utah in Dixon v.
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) held that the doctrine of last clear chance as a distinct tort
doctrine was extinguished along with contributory negligence by virtue of the Comparative
Negligence Act. The court noted: "Our decision here does not preclude argument to the jury
as to whether a party may or may not have had the "last clear chance" to avoid injury.
However, the old "all or nothing" doctrine is now subsumed within comparative negligence and
as bearing on which party was guilty of greater negligence, "last clear chance" becomes just one
of many factors to be weighed in the comparison by the finder of fact." Id. at 598, n.7. See
accord. Stephens v. Henderson. 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987)(discussing assumption of the risk).
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III.

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT NOV OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE. A NEW TRIAL FOR PLAINTIFF
A. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
Plaintiff alleges that she was entitled to judgment NOV since the evidence, viewed in the

light most favorable to the defendant, supported a judgment only for the plaintiff. Although,
as plaintiff states, her theory was that she was rear-ended by the defendant without any fault
whatsoever, see plaintiffs brief at 34, the facts show otherwise.

Plaintiff herself recognizes

that a judgment NOV can be granted only when the losing party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. Id. (citing Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). Since both
plaintiffs' motions for judgment NOV or, in the alternative, for a new trial, attack the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, in order to seek review thereof, the plaintiff
must marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict and then show that the evidence cannot
support the verdict.
In this case, plaintiff fails to marshal the evidence. More specifically, plaintiff has failed
to follow the appellate court's instructions as laid out in West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co..
818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), and more recently recited in Oneida-SLIC v.
Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) wherein the
court stated:
[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the [marshalling] duty. . . the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence produced at trial which supports the very finding the appellant resists.
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Id. Thereafter, the appellant must show the verdict is so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of evidence, thus making the verdict clearly erroneous. Id. The appellate courts
have noted that the marshalling requirement reflects that the appellate courts do not sit to retry
cases and will refuse to consider the merits of challenges if the evidence is not marshalled.
Plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence in this case, and in fact, the same could be
said of plaintiff's arguments as was said concerning a challenged sufficiency of the evidence in
Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991): "As written, their arguments are
reasonable and have persuasive effect. From the point of view of appellate procedure, however,
they ignore the rules designed to give stability to jury verdicts." The court in Hodges found that
the appealing party had failed to marshal the evidence and stated: "We emphasize it is counsel's
professional duty to analyze the evidence with care and provide record citations for every
asserted factual proposition." I(L Appellant's duty implicitly also includes, as stated above, that
the appellant may not omit items of evidence which hurt her case. Because plaintiff failed to
marshal the evidence in this case, plaintiff should be precluded from seeking review of this
matter.
B. THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL SUPPORTS THE VERDICT
Contrary to plaintiffs assertion, and contrary to the statement of facts cited by the
plaintiff, the evidence presented to the jury in this case supports the jury's finding of no
negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff, herself, was forced to admit the nature
and extent of the adverse weather conditions and the fact that they arose unexpectedly. The
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defendant testified that he was traveling at a reasonable and prudent speed (50 miles an hour),
clearly less than the speed limit, and reacted by braking at the first sign of danger, particularly
seeing snow blow across the road. In fact, plaintiff herself, at this trial conceded to traveling
at approximately the same speed prior to slowing down for the same perceived problem. This
brings forth the fact that the plaintiff can point to no evidence presented at trial which supports
the allegation of negligence on the part of defendant beyond the mere facts that the accident
occurred and defendant struck plaintiff from behind.
The appellate court should look to the evidence which the plaintiff failed to marshal in
order to find an evidentiary basis for the verdict. As provided in defendant's statement of the
facts, the evidence in this case showed that the weather where the accident occurred consisted
of wind and blowing snow. The highway was wet and visibility was severely diminished. The
plaintiff admitted that she was mainly focused on the snow plow, arguably not paying attention
to the cars in front or in back of her. Plaintiff observed brake lights flashing ahead of her, and
put on her brakes. She moved into the defendant's lane, and continued to slow down. She
admitted that she was nervous prior to the accident and has a rather paranoid attitude to traveling
on the road.
Plaintiff's testimony was inconsistent concerning her distance from the snow plow. She
stated she was two minutes past the snow plow, she was within feet of the snow plow, and that
she was directly next to the snow plow. (R. 508 at 77, at 109, and at 124). Plaintiff herself
found the snow to be blinding (R. 508 at 116), and she braked because she thought she might
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strike someone ahead of her, at the same time acknowledging that the driver behind her might
not be able to see her or stop in time.
Although at one point in her testimony she claims to have seen the defendant prior to the
impact, she also stated in prior testimony that she did not see the defendant prior to the
bumping, and actually had no idea where he came from. She indicated that she had been thrown
forward and then back and that items in the seat were also thrown forward. (R. 508 at 127-28).
This evidence indicates that the plaintiff simply stopped too fast and that because of her
imprudent action a minor bumping between the two vehicles occurred. Upon this evidence the
jury could have believed that the cause of the accident was plaintiffs negligence, or at most a
result of severe weather conditions.
There is no evidence below that the defendant was traveling at a speed too fast for
conditions, or that he was following the plaintiff too closely. At all times when the defendant
Mr. Sharp could see the plaintiffs vehicle he maintained a reasonable distance behind her. It
was only after the plaintiff moved into a cloud of snow and changed lanes that the defendant
closed the distance between himself and the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff could not be seen, Mr.
Sharp could only assume, as the law provides, that the plaintiff would not slow too quickly and
cause an accident. See Mulbach v. Hertig. 15 Utah 2d 121, 388 P.2d 414 (1964). As soon as
the snow cleared and the defendant was able to perceive the plaintiff, he reacted and attempted
to avoid the accident. A thorough review of the record below provides no evidence of any
distance between defendant's and plaintiffs vehicle which could be considered unreasonable
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under the circumstances. In fact, defendant felt that if the plaintiff had pushed on the gas, no
accident would have occurred.8 (R. 509 at 169). The defendant testified that he was not in a
hurry as he had no schedule to meet. (R. 509 at 181). Although he stated that he did know the
snow plows would plow snow on the highway, he had never experienced snow being thrown up
by a snow plow and blinding the cars in the area. (R. 509 at 191). The defendant stated that
the plaintiff stopped or almost stopped prior to impact and estimated her speed at impact at 5
to 10 miles an hour. A jury could easily have found the person driving 5 miles an hour in a 65
mile an hour zone even in this bad weather was negligent. The jury could have also found that
due to the circumstances neither party was negligent.
The court properly instructed the jury about the duty of drivers, particularly to exercise
a proper lookout, keep their vehicle at a safe speed, and under control enough to stop suddenly.
As pointed out, the evidence exhibits that the plaintiff entered a cloud of snow and immediately
depressed her brakes. The plaintiff testified at her deposition and prior to trial that the impact
moved her forward, or at least she perceived being moved forward. Plaintiff further testified
that objects which were on the seat were thrown forward onto the floor. As defendant's counsel
pointed out in closing argument, applying Newton's Second Law, if one were hit from behind,
objects would be thrown back, not forward. Plaintiff admitted that she had depressed her brake,
although she could not recall exactly to what extent she had braked. She believed she did not

8

Plaintiff does state that she was pushing on the gas, but the car would not go any faster.
(R. 508 at 120). The jury, of course, could disregard this statement if they did not believe her.
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brake very hard because she allegedly did not have to gear down. However, her statements that
she moved forward, and the evidence adduced through her testimony that objects in her car were
thrown forward, indicates she must have been braking quite hard. Such evidence warrants the
verdict in that the jury could find that the plaintiff entered a cloud of snow during unusually bad
conditions created, not by normal winter conditions to be expected, but by a snow plow to the
side of the road, and that the plaintiff stopped hastily and imprudently.
The jury could have found that the defendant acted prudently under the circumstances.
As the law of negligence was explained to the jury by the court, the standard of care owed is
not one of an exceptional driver, but only a reasonably prudent one. The evidence supports the
jury's finding the defendant acted prudently under the circumstances.
As plaintiffs cursory analysis as to her entitlement to a new trial exhibits, plaintiff has
only asserted that she is entitled to a new trial based upon the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
59(a)(1) and (7). Both of the grounds as stated by the plaintiff are simply a reiteration of her
previous arguments regarding whether a presumption of negligence exists and an instruction
thereto should have been given, and whether the jury may consider an unavoidable accident
theory. Accordingly, there is no reason for defendant to reargue these matters in the context
of a motion for a new trial.
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TSL

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION IN AWARDING
DEFENDANT'S COSTS
The plaintiff asks this court to reverse the Utah Supreme Court.9

The Utah Supreme

Court has held that the expenses of taking depositions are allowable as costs when they are
reasonably necessary. John Price Assoc. Inc. v. Davis. 588 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978). The
trial court's ruling on whether to award a party costs of depositions is presumed correct and will
not be disturbed unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. First
Sec. Bank of Utah N.A. v. Wright. 521 P.2d 563, 567 (Utah 1974). If the trial court is
persuaded that the depositions at issue were taken in good faith and in light of the circumstances
appear to have been essential to the development and presentation of the case, then they may be
awarded as costs. Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980).
In Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) the appellate court, based upon

9

Plaintiff asserts in her brief that the standards for determining which deposition costs
should be allowed is unworkable. See plaintiffs brief at 44. Plaintiff makes this claim because,
in reviewing numerous cases concerning deposition costs, the plaintiff has found that in some
cases depositions which were not used at trial were taxed as costs, and in other cases they were
disallowed. However, the focus of plaintiff s analysis is misplaced. Conscientious review of
the cases cited by the plaintiff indicated that in every instance the court is reviewing whether the
trial court abused its discretion in allowing or disallowing deposition costs to be taxed.
Accordingly, as there is great deference given to the trial court and a manifest abuse of
discretion must be shown in order to reverse the trial court's determination, it is only natural
that under some circumstances the trial court will allow deposition costs where under other
circumstances a trial court may not. There is no inconsistency to be found. In every case, the
appellate courts of Utah have been completely consistent in giving deference to the trial court
and only reversing the trial court under appropriate circumstances. Particularly, in Lloyds
Unlimited v. Nature's Way Mktg.. Ltd.. 753 P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) the appellate court
did not disallow the costs of depositions, but upheld the trial court's denial of those costs.
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defendant's original verified memorandum and the findings of the court, found that the plaintiff
had not shown that the depositions were taken in bad faith or were not essential for the
development of the case, or that the information elicited could have been obtained through less
expensive means. The court held specifically: "In light of the nature of this case, we cannot say
the trial court abused its discretion by allowing these deposition costs." Id. at 476.
Plaintiff has argued that the case at hand is a simple negligence case with no complex
theories of liability and causation, and that due to a lack of complexity, deposition costs should
not have been awarded. See plaintiffs brief at 47. However, when the facts of this case are
compared with those of Ames v. Maas. also an automobile accident case, plaintiffs claim of
lack of complexity precluding the award of deposition costs appears meritless. In Ames, the
plaintiff and the defendant's vehicles were both traveling at a low speed when they reached a
curve at the same time. Due to the slick conditions of the road, defendant lost control of her
vehicle, sliding across the center of the road and striking plaintiffs automobile. I<1 at 470.
Under these facts the Ames court allowed deposition costs. Id. at 476.
The case at bar was even more complex than Ames. In this case, the parties could not
even agree on what exactly had happened. There was conflicting testimony on the part of
plaintiff and it was essential for the development of the case for the deposition of the plaintiff
be taken. Plaintiff's argument that the case was not complex appears somewhat disingenuous
as evidenced by the fact that the plaintiff engaged the services of an accident reconstructionist.
If the case was not complex, then such expert testimony or analysis would not be helpful to the
37

plaintiff. In any event, a review of the facts brings about the conclusion that enough complexity
concerning the case existed that the depositions were reasonable and necessary. Accordingly,
plaintiffs assertion that this case was not complex enough to warrant depositions as a means of
discovery must fail.

A*

BOTH DEFENDANT AND THE COURT FOLLOWED PROPER
PROCEDURE IN REGARD TO COSTS

In the same manner as in the case of Ames v. Maas. defendant submitted his costs
pursuant to a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements which was verified by defendant's
counsel. Thereafter, the trial court made specific findings that the deposition costs were
reasonable and necessary. The trial court's determination as to whether deposition costs are
reasonable and necessary is not made in a vacuum. The trial judge viewed the evidence,
reviewed the theories of the respective parties, observed the cross-examination and impeachment
of the parties and witnesses, and also heard proffers of evidence. Accordingly, the trial court
needed to receive no additional testimony or other evidence in order to adjudge whether a
deposition was necessary to the preparation of a case, was used in court, taken in preparation
of cross-examining an expert witness, or was a deposition of the only objective witness in the
case. The Utah Supreme Court inLawson Supply Co. v. General Plumbing & Heating. Inc..
27 Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972) stated:
Recoverable costs include the expense of taking depositions, unless it is made to
appear the depositions were unnecessary. Whether the taking of a deposition was
reasonably necessary to the protection of a party's rights is a question primarily
for the trial court to decide on all the facts and circumstances of the case. . . .
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Id. at 609. This is exactly what the court below did.
Nonetheless, plaintiff claims that defendant in the present case has failed to carry his
burden of proof as to costs and that the court committed reversible error in granting the costs
where no evidence was put on that the costs were reasonable and necessary. Plaintiff cites the
cases of Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and Birchcreek Irrigation v.
Prothero, 858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993) in support of her argument. Both of these cases are
distinguishable and do not stand for the propositions for which they are submitted. In Morgan,
the court remanded (not reversed) the issue of costs to the trial court to determine if the
deposition costs were reasonably necessary. Morgan. 795 at 687. The court did so because the
findings and conclusions in the divorce decree did not make any finding as to whether the costs
were reasonable and necessary. IcL In contrast, in this case, the trial court entered an order
stating: "The court finds the costs submitted by the defendant to be reasonable and necessary
and sets the amount at $2,100.17." (R. 479). Therefore, Morgan is inapplicable to this case.
The case of Birchcreek Irrigation v. Prothero is even more irrelevant. In Birchcreek. the
court's discussion revolved solely around a temporary restraining order as admitted by plaintiff
in her brief. See plaintiff's brief at 47, n.8. While the court does state that conclusory
statements will not suffice to support a TRO, the court does so, pointing out: "We require, as
the rule articulates, an explicit and complete definition of the harm and its irreparable nature."
Id. at 995. Clearly, the court's decision in Birchcreek was decided under and is applicable only
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(b), whereas the issue in this case has to do with Utah Rule
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of Civil Procedure 54(d).
To hold otherwise would be to vitiate the plain language of the Rule of Civil Procedure.
Rule 54(d)(2) provides:
The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment
serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of the
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action,
and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to
affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been
necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding.
(Emphasis added). Rule 54, therefore, specifically outlines the manner of proof to be submitted
to the court in regard to costs. As the record in this case indicates, defendant's counsel
explicitly followed the course of action directed by subsection (d)(2) of Rule 54.
Where the party seeking costs has followed explicitly the procedure as outlined in Rule
54(d) and where the trial court has made specific findings and conclusions that the depositions
were reasonable and necessary, no error can be found. Accordingly, there are no grounds to
reverse the trial court's award of costs in this matter.
B^

THE DEPOSITIONS COSTS AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANT WERE
REASONABLE AND NECESSARY

The deposition costs awarded included the costs of the depositions of the parties. The
court in Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) specifically held that the depositions
of the parties are acceptable costs. Id at 476. As a separate basis for allowing the costs, the
Ames court stated that depositions used in trial are permissible costs. Both the deposition of
Anna Anderson and Leonard Sharp were used extensively in the proceedings. See e.g. R. 508
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at 100, 107, 118, 120, 128, and 134, and R. 509 at 187.
The Ames court also held that depositions of any expert witness the adverse party may
call are an allowable cost.10 David Beaufort was an expert witness that had been designated
by the plaintiff. Greg Duval was retained by the defendant, however his deposition was taken
at the request of the plaintiff. The court awarded the cost of a copy of Mr. Duval's deposition.
Although the jury determined this case on the basis of liability, the issue of whether a minor
impact could cause the injuries claimed by the plaintiff was hotly debated. In this regard, expert
witnesses had been questioned in relation to force as well as fault. Accordingly, the taking of
their depositions was both reasonable and necessary as held by the Ames court.
Lastly, the deposition of Michael Sabey was necessary to the development of the case.
Mr. Sabey was the only objective witness to the accident. Mr. Sabey was called by the plaintiff
and testified in the first trial of this matter and his deposition was used therein for impeachment
purposes. (R. 506 at 234). Therefore, because his deposition was necessary for the development
of the case and because the deposition was used at trial, the deposition of Mr. Sabey was an
allowable cost.

10

On page 43 of her brief, plaintiff claims that the case of Redevelopment Agency in
S.L.C. v. Daskalas. 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) discusses expert witness fees and
whether they are reimbursable costs under Rule 54(d). This case is, of course, completely
irrelevant to the present appeal as no expert witness fees were awarded. In this case, only the
costs of depositions of expert witnesses were awarded as specifically provided for in Ames.
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^

THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIOR TRIAL WAS A REASONABLE
EXPENSE UNDER RULE 54(d)

As has been previously stated, costs are allowed where they are specifically provided for
by statute, such as witness fees and interpreter fees. Specifically provided for in the Utah Code
is the cost of a transcript. Section 78-56-8(l)(a) of the Utah Code Annotated provides: "A
transcript may not be taxed as costs, unless the preparation of the transcript is ordered either by
a party or by the court." In this case, defendant (a party) ordered the preparation of the
transcript of the prior trial and therefore is entitled to reimbursement of that sum as an allowable
cost. The court was well within its discretion to allow this cost as it is provided for in the Utah
Code, but also the role it played in the second trial highlights its necessity. The plaintiffs
testimony in the second trial was at odds and inconsistent with the prior testimony both in her
deposition and the transcript of the first trial. The transcript of the first trial provided fertile
ground for impeachment material and was most likely a material item of evidence in the jury
disbelieving some of the claims of the plaintiff. See e.g. R. 508 at 100, 111, 113, and 116.
For these reasons, the transcript was necessary and a reasonable expense, was specifically
provided for by the Utah Code as a taxable cost, and was properly awarded by the court in this
matter. Plaintiff has stated no basis upon which this court should find that the transcript should
not have been taxable as a cost.
The need for the trial transcript is also highlighted by the fact that plaintiff read in
excerpts of the testimony of Dr. McClean and Dr. Charles Smith. R. 509 at 156. In that the
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plaintiff was not reading in the entire transcript of those doctors, it was incumbent upon the
defendant to review the transcripts in order to assure that the testimony given to the jury was
complete. It would, of course, be unfair to allow the plaintiff to read a transcript into the
record, but not afford the opposing party an opportunity to review that same record.
Lastly, to deny defendant reimbursement of the trial transcript of the first trial is to visit
the sin of the plaintiff upon the defendant.

It was due to the plaintiffs actions, specifically

conversing and assuming a rapport with a jury member in the previous trial (R. 507 at 372-76),
that the first trial ended in a mistrial. Had plaintiff not so acted, a second trial would not have
been necessary. Likewise, it would not have been necessary for the defendant to procure a
transcript of the first trial. It would be inequitable for this court not to allow the defendants the
costs of the transcript of the first trial when it was the plaintiff herself who necessitated the need
for a second trial.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has waived her right to a review of the majority of the issues raised in
this appeal by not preserving them in a timely manner. Defendant requests this court to affirm
the trial court's verdict as well as the court's order taxing costs against plaintiff. Plaintiff has
argued no reasonable grounds for a reversal and the record is clear that plaintiff had her day in
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court and is entitled to nothing more.11
DATED AND SIGNED this j^Jld;ay of October, 1994.
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1

Plaintiff in her conclusion asks for attorney's fees incurred in bringing this appeal.
Plaintiff has stated no basis for the award of attorney's fees. She herself brought the appeal and
therefore cannot claim the appeal is frivolous or brought in bad faith. This litigation does not
arise out of a contract or any statutory provision allowing for attorney's fees. Absent statutory
or contractual authority therefore, attorney's fees are not recoverable. Collier v. Heinze. 827
P.2d 982, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DeBry & Hilton Travel v. Capitol Airwavs. 583 P.2d
1181, 1183 (Utah 1978). In sum, plaintiffs prayer for attorney's fees is without merit.
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